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NO. 18 MARCH 2019 Introduction 
Three Scenarios for the Development of 
the Sisi Regime in Egypt 
Development Dictatorship, Mubarak 2.0, or Rapid Collapse? 
Luca Miehe and Stephan Roll 
A referendum on a constitutional amendment is to be held in Egypt at the beginning 
of May, which would enable President Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi to continue governing after 
the end of his current term. In the face of massive repression, approval seems certain. 
This would largely complete the power consolidation of the Sisi-regime, which emerged 
from the military coup of July 2013. But how will this regime develop in the future? 
Possible scenarios are a successful development dictatorship, decades of political and 
economic stagnation, as under Hosni Mubarak, or imminent failure. While a develop-
ment dictatorship is unrealistic due to a lack of willingness to reform, the other two 
scenarios entail major risks for Germany and its European partners. In the future, they 
should therefore link new budgetary assistance to improvements in human and civil 
rights, focus on humanitarian crisis prevention in line with the “do no harm” approach, 
and expand contacts with representatives of the Egyptian opposition outside of Egypt. 
 
At the heart of the draft for a constitutional 
amendment – adopted for the first time by 
the Egyptian parliament on 14 February – 
lies an extension of the president’s term 
from four to six years. The amendment is 
to apply retroactively, meaning that already 
completed years in office would not pre-
clude him from running again. President 
Sisi could therefore run two more times 
after the end of his second term in 2022. 
He would thus be able to remain president 
until 2034, when he is 80 years old. In addi-
tion, from now on the military will be 
responsible for “protecting the constitution 
and democracy.” The already omnipotent 
armed forces would thereby formally be 
above the constitution, accelerating the 
militarization of the state. In addition to 
reducing the size of the parliament and 
introducing quotas for members of parlia-
ment, further changes are aimed at streng-
thening the presidency vis-à-vis the legis-
lative and judicial branches. For example, 
the Egyptian Upper House, which was abol-
ished in 2014, is to be reintroduced; in the 
past, the president had appointed one-third 
of its members. The president will also chair 
a new “Council of Judicial Bodies,” which 
will have far-reaching powers to fill top 
judicial posts. Furthermore, the budgetary 
independence of the judiciary is to be abol-
ished. 
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A failure of the amendment in the final 
reading at the end of March is regarded 
as being almost impossible. The few parlia-
mentarians who voiced criticisms have 
been exposed to smear campaigns; numer-
ous members of small opposition parties 
have been arrested. The referendum, planned 
for May, will take place in a climate of fear, 
similar to the presidential election a year 
ago. With at least 60,000 political prisoners, 
the systematic use of torture, and the state-
controlled media, a free and fair vote is 
impossible. 
The constitutional referendum concludes 
the consolidation of the Sisi regime. It 
began with the military coup in July 2013, 
which paved the way for the then-defense 
minister to take office as president. Since 
then, resistance to Sisi’s rule has been sup-
pressed with brutal force. Police-state 
repression was directed not only against the 
opposition – especially against supporters 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, now classified 
as a terrorist organization. Potential com-
petitors of the president in the state’s 
elite were also eliminated, such as Khaled 
Fawzy, the former head of the General 
Intelligence Service (GIS), and Mahmoud 
Hegazy, the army’s chief of staff. This cam-
paign seems to be steered by a small power 
circle around the president. In addition to 
Abbas Kamel – Sisi’s former chief of staff, 
who now heads the foreign secret service – 
its members are his sons Hassan and Mah-
moud, who hold high positions in the GIS, 
and his eldest son, Mustafa, who works 
in the powerful Administrative Control 
Authority. 
With the climax of Sisi’s power consoli-
dation, however, the question arises as to 
how his regime will develop in the coming 
years. There are three conceivable scenarios, 
each with a different probability of occur-
rence. 
Scenario 1 – “Successful 
Development Dictator” 
Sisi’s supporters argue that the president 
needs more time to realize his development 
visions. Through megaprojects such as the 
expansion of the Suez Canal as well as the 
construction of a new capital and a nuclear 
power plant, Sisi wants to give the country 
a development boost. The floating of the 
exchange rate, the cut in energy and com-
modity subsidies, and the exploitation of 
newly discovered natural gas deposits are 
aimed to improve the precarious financial 
situation and make Egypt independent of 
international financial aid. In the long run, 
experts from international financial insti-
tutions sometimes suggest that the country 
could develop into a prosperous economy 
under Sisi’s leadership. 
However, there are two obstacles to 
this scenario. Firstly, the megaprojects, 
announced by Sisi in highly emotional 
speeches, are by no means evidence of 
adequate awareness of the current prob-
lems. These projects do not solve the coun-
try’s core socio-economic problems: neither 
the dilapidated infrastructure, the inade-
quate education system, nor the exuberant 
shadow economy. The funds spent on the 
expansion of the Suez Canal (more than $8 
billion), for example, could have been used 
more expediently. 
On the other hand, the military’s posi-
tion of power impedes the country’s devel-
opment. Reforms always stop where the 
interests of the armed forces are affected. 
During Sisi’s presidency, the armed forces 
significantly expanded their activities in 
the civilian economy – and thus hindered 
the development of a competitive market 
economy. In addition, military spending is 
surging. Egypt more than tripled its arms 
purchases between 2014 and 2018 com-
pared to the 2009–2013 period, making 
it the world’s third-largest arms importer. 
The state’s positive reports on the in-
crease in economic growth (in the first 
quarter of 2018/19 at 5.3 percent) and a 
falling unemployment rate must be viewed 
with caution. They are based on dubious 
public statistics and are not indicators of a 
reversing trend. The business and invest-
ment climate remains poor (in the 2019 
“Doing Business” index of the World Bank, 
it ranked 120th of 190 countries). Foreign 
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direct investment is still well-below the 
level of the economic boom years between 
2006 and 2008. Above all, government debt 
is rising unstoppably: Between March 2013 
and the end of 2018, foreign debt rose 
by 142 percent, to $93.1 billion. Potential 
additional government revenues, such as 
from the expansion of natural gas produc-
tion, are likely to be consumed by the high 
level of debt service alone (currently more 
than 40 percent of government spending). 
Egypt’s alleged economic upswing has thus 
been bought at a high price. 
Scenario 2 – “Mubarak 2.0” 
If President Sisi does not prevail in deliv-
ering the envisioned development successes 
to Egypt, this would not necessarily mean 
the end of his presidency. Former President 
Mubarak (1981–2011) was also unable to 
improve the socio-economic situation in 
the country. Nevertheless, he was able to 
remain in power for 30 years. This was 
mainly due to massive external support 
from Western states and successful elite 
management. 
President Sisi can also count on extensive 
foreign support. Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Kuwait provided finan-
cial and commodity aid amounting to more 
than $12 billion immediately after the mili-
tary coup in 2013. The Europeans were ex-
tremely willing to support the regime, par-
ticularly in view of the increase in irregular 
migration flows in 2015/16. They supported 
Egypt’s efforts to obtain a $12 billion loan 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
with additional financial assistance, with-
out demanding an improvement in human 
rights or governance. It is questionable, 
however, whether the Gulf States and Euro-
peans can, and will, continue to meet the 
rising financial needs, which will remain 
substantial, especially after the IMF pro-
gram expires at the end of 2019. Scenario 2 
could therefore become extremely costly for 
donors. For example, with $7.1 billion, Ger-
many was already the largest creditor behind 
international organizations ($28.4 billion) 
and the Gulf monarchies ($23.1 billion) in 
mid-2018. 
President Sisi’s elite management differs 
markedly from that of Mubarak. He has 
not shown any effort, for example, to form 
a loyal ruling party as a foundation for 
his power, along the lines of the National 
Democratic Party ruling under Mubarak. 
Rather, Sisi has – so far successfully – 
built on his close relations with the security 
apparatus and an extremely authoritarian 
style of military leadership. In view of the 
spread of poverty and a lack of social jus-
tice, he is likely to use much more force in 
this scenario in the future to secure his 
own power. 
Scenario 3 – “Sisi Fails” 
A lack of development progress and increas-
ing repression could very quickly lead to the 
end of the regime. Further cuts in spending 
are likely to be met with mass protests, 
especially by members of the middle class, 
who have already suffered considerably 
from the government’s austerity measures 
in recent years. Another conceivable trigger 
could be an acute crisis in the provision of 
basic services, such as water, or due to the 
crumbling transport infrastructure. Success-
ful protests in other countries in the region, 
such as Algeria and Sudan, could further 
intensify the dynamics of protest. An exces-
sive use of force by the police might con-
tain individual demonstrations for the time 
being but could also have an escalating 
effect. 
Resistance from parts of the elite, and 
even the security apparatus, is also a con-
ceivable threat to the Sisi regime. The mili-
tary, the Interior Ministry, and the secret 
services are all profiteers of the president’s 
current policies. However, Sisi has also 
made enemies by depriving top officials of 
privileges – for example, requiring presi-
dential approval for trips abroad – and 
above all by constantly rotating personnel. 
The imprisonment of former state officials 
with their own political ambitions – in-
cluding the former chief of staff Sami Anan 
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and the former head of the Central Auditing 
Organization Hisham Genena – is likely to 
cause additional bitterness among segments 
of the elite. 
As abstract as this scenario may seem 
from today’s perspective, developments in 
2011 have shown that protest dynamics 
and elite conflicts can hardly be predicted. 
Conclusion 
Although the scenario of a development 
dictatorship appears less plausible, the 
occurrence of one of the other two sce-
narios is much more likely. Both are asso-
ciated with high risks and costs, for Ger-
many and the European Union (EU). The 
central prerequisite for the “Mubarak 2.0” 
scenario would be permanent, substantial 
financial assistance, which would primarily 
be to the detriment of European national 
budgets, as well as the acceptance of a fur-
ther deterioration in the human rights situa-
tion. In this way, socio-economic decline 
could, at best, be slowed. Migration pres-
sure and radicalization tendencies among 
young Egyptians are likely to increase. 
The scenario of regime collapse offers an 
opportunity for political reform. However, 
the current militarization of the regime and 
the associated disabling of all independent 
civil society stand in the way of these re-
forms, as does the dramatic deterioration in 
the living conditions of a large segment of 
the population. Unlike 2011, the collapse 
could therefore be much more eruptive and 
less peaceful. A possible consequence could 
be the collapse of state structures in the 
most populous country in the European 
neighborhood. 
Against this backdrop, Germany and the 
EU should press more than before for the 
protection of an independent civil society 
as well as for measures to be taken for sus-
tainable and inclusive economic develop-
ment in Egypt. This not only includes point-
ing out to the Sisi regime the incompatibil-
ity of the planned constitutional reform with 
the “good governance” principles applicable 
to development cooperation. Equally im-
portant is clear criticism – for example 
at the UN Human Rights Council – of the 
continuing infringements on human and 
civil rights. Above all, in the foreseeable 
renegotiations on further budgetary assis-
tance, conditions should be imposed that, 
unlike in the past, are not aimed solely at 
austerity, but also at improving the human 
and civil rights situation as well as good 
governance. When it comes to project aid, 
much more attention should be paid to the 
implementation of the “do no harm” prin-
ciple to prevent aid from being used for 
the further expansion of repressive power 
structures. Finally, the German government 
should expand contacts with representa-
tives of the exiled Egyptian opposition, in-
cluding Islamist actors. Thereby, it could 
support mediation processes between differ-
ent social groups in the event of regime 
collapse. 
Dr Stephan Roll is Head, Luca Miehe Research Assistant of the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
 
 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, 2019 
All rights reserved 
This Comment reflects 
the authors’ views. 
The online version of 
this publication contains 
functioning links to other 
SWP texts and other relevant 
sources. 
SWP Comments are subject 
to internal peer review, fact-
checking and copy-editing. 
For further information on 
our quality control pro-
cedures, please visit the SWP 
website: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/about-swp/ 
quality-management-for-
swp-publications/ 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 
International and 
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
doi: 10.18449/2019C18 
(English version of 
SWP-Aktuell 17/2019) 
